Martial fantasies of battlefield valor and guerrilla glory in shoot-outs and throat-slitting sentry neutralizations aside, the ultimate success or failure of a resistance movement does not reside solely on the tactical prowess of the scared, cold guys with guns hiding out in the forests and mountains (although they are important). All the way back, through the dim, misty curtains of time, to the Maccabees, the success of a resistance movement has depended in the long term, on its ability to maintain the support functions of an active auxiliary organization.
Regardless of the initial political persuasions of the local civilian populace, in order to be ultimately successful, a resistance must gain the willing support of the civilian populace, and be able to organize that support into a coordinated, functional effort. While the active paramilitary guerrilla force is off, freezing and starving at Valley Forge, the task of developing and organizing that civilian support falls on the auxiliary (see what I did there?)
(We who are active in the Liberty movement, especially many of us in the blogosphere, like to throw out the III% label, perhaps too quickly in many cases. The reality is, while yes, only three percent of the colonials actively took the field against the British Empire at any one time, the division of support between the warring elements was closer to thirds: one-third supported the rebellion, one-third supported the Crown, and one-third just didn’t give a shit, as long as their kids were housed and fed. After all, neither Thomas Jefferson nor Benjamin Franklin ever took the field of battle during the conflict….were they somehow less dedicated to the Cause?
The job of the auxiliary is two-fold. On the one hand, they need to organize the support of the first third into functional assistance for the resistance. Second, they need to convince the last third to begin actively supporting the resistance, rather than sitting on the fence. The middle third, you’re probably not going to change the minds of. Killing them however, will probably ruin much of the support you might gain from the third who are on the fence however…so, leave them be, and when you’ve won, deport their Tory asses to Canada….)
Fortunately, the use of the auxiliary to gain and develop support from the local civilian population lends some distinct advantages from a PSYOP perspective. While the regime is busy labeling the guerrillas as nothing more than bandits and brigands (or “bitter clingers”), the public is approached by the auxiliary…who are normal, run-of-the mill neighbors. These are guys they see and deal with every day. They’re not camo-wearing nutjobs hiding out in the hills. This one is on the city council for Christ’s sake, and that one is the manager of the local Wal-Mart warehouse! It may be far easier for the neighbor they see every day, the guy who is apparently just like them, trying to raise his kids and make a living, to convince John and Jane Doe, to donate their time, food, or money, to the resistance than it will be for the dirty, mud- and blood-stained guys with guns, who haven’t showered in three months, and hide out in the woods…except when they show up at zero-holy-fuck-it’s-dark-outside-who’s-banging-on-my-door-at-this-hour, to demand food and shelter.
Make no mistake about it. As important as the guerrilla force is, without the auxiliary, they won’t last six weeks.
For operational security (OPSEC) and personnel security (PERSEC) reasons, auxiliary functions cells must be compartmentalized from each other and from the guerrilla force. This prevents one person being captured from allowing the regime to roll up an entire resistance network. This compartmentalization however, when done properly, still allows for control and coordination between subordinate elements, through the use of clandestine communications.
Ideally, each auxiliary cell under the control of the local area command, would fulfill a unique function (logistics, medical, PSYOP, recruiting, etc), and be redundant as well, by having a “sister” cell also dedicated to that function. Whenever possible, in the presence of an organized area command, and with adequate personnel, auxiliary cells SHOULD be organized into this type of functionally compartmentalized structure. Historically however, every auxiliary cell has had to perform multiple roles due to shortages of trustworthy, loyal, proven personnel.
The auxiliary, like the local guerrilla defense force, should organize to coincide with the existing political administration (i.e. neighborhood, town/village, city, county, state, etc….not city council, mayor, sheriff, etc….), and may be either centralized or de-centralized, depending on the situation of the resistance politically and militarily. At each level, a command committee controls and coordinates activities of the auxiliary within its area of responsibility. Members of the command committee may fill one role, or multiple roles, but based on their professional backgrounds, interests, and abilities, will take on specific duties, such as: security, intelligence, PSYOP, communications, transportation, supply, and recruiting, among others.
Each member of the command committee will then, independent of the others, begin developing his personal network. He’ll find three or four or five people he knows and trusts locally, preferably who are not socially connected to one another, who possess vocational or avocational knowledge of his area of responsibility, and start them on developing their subordinate cells in the exact same way. The command committee member may elect to introduce these subordinate “assistant cell leaders” to one another, or he may keep their existence secret from one another (the first rule of fight club….). Below the the assistant cell leader level however, even in a small, close-knit community, members of one cell should certainly not be aware of the identities of other cell’s members, or even the existence of other cells.
(I would add, if you are a member of more than one group who elects to stand up a command committee, it is certainly possible that you could develop parallel cells of auxiliary, in different areas of the community, but a better application would be as the liaison between two different command committees, to prevent, or at least reduce, the unnecessary reproduction of efforts.)
Recruiting the Auxiliary Membership
As cell leaders begin to look for “recruits” for their auxiliary cells, they should initially look at their own family and social networks for trusted people they’ve known for years, and who they know wholeheartedly support the causes of the resistance (let’s face it, if you don’t have three or four friends or relatives who share your beliefs and whom you trust with your life….you’re a pretty sorry excuse for a human being….and before you go any further in your resistance education, I suggest you visit your local library and check out a copy of Dale Carnegie’s “How to Win Friends and Influence People.”).
Members of the auxiliary are people who maintain their residence, occupation, and lifestyle, within the local area. They must, at all times, maintain the appearance of “average citizens.” The surest way to maintain the security of your cells is to stick to local friends and relatives with good reputations in their social circles, who are genuinely supportive of the resistance movement and possibly have friends or family members fighting with the guerrilla force. People who are duped into supporting the resistance and find out that they’ve been duped, or people who are coerced to support the resistance through force, are not the auxiliary, and will in fact, turn you in to the regime at the earliest opportunity, through fear, resentment, or even simply embarrassment.
As your network expands outward, your friends will recruit their friends that they’ve known for years, but you may not know. In turn, those friends will recruit their friends that your friend may not know. It becomes a multi-cellular organism, evolved from the uni-cellular organization you started with, very quickly. As it grows however, so does the risk of compromise.
The two most important considerations in the survival and effectiveness of an auxiliary organization are maintaining the “average citizen” image, and being extremely cautious about confiding in others. Certain behaviors and aspects should always be kept in mind by members of the auxiliary:
- Maintain the “average citizen” image. Never allow yourself to look out-of-place, or draw attention to yourself. When you are performing auxiliary functions, you should have a legitimate, easily verified reason for being where you are, with what you have. If you must go some place where you don’t have an excuse for being, ensure that regime security forces don’t have an excuse to stop you. Michael Collins, even as part of the Irish Dail, and a wanted fugitive by the British, was able to travel about Dublin, on a bicycle, with no security. He simply dressed well, and no one would think that such as well-dressed bloke could possibly be a bad-guy.
- Don’t miss work, without a legitimate reason, to conduct auxiliary activities. Pretty soon, you’ll end up fired, and/or people will begin to question how you can maintain your lifestyle while you’re missing so many hours.
- Don’t show an unusual concern about security force activities. Don’t stop to gawk at an arrest when everyone else is ignoring it. On the same hand however, don’t make it a point to NOT watch what’s going on when everyone else IS stopping to gawk.
- Be able to account for missing materials. If you’re pilfering food off your warehouse deliveries to siphon off to the guerrillas, make sure you’re figuring out a way to account for them. “Well, they must have been stolen,” won’t work more than once or twice. “Gee, thieves have taken the same 500lbs of rice every week for the last six weeks, and you didn’t notice? Let’s see how these pretty silver bracelets look on you.”
- Confiding too freely to strangers. Seriously? If some dude you don’t know at all is talking about the resistance while you’re sitting at the bus stop or on a bar stool…he’s either an idiot, or he works for the regime. Either way, don’t tell him shit. Even if he comes recommended to you, don’t give up information he doesn’t need to know. In the here and now, I constantly preach to you, “don’t be so paranoid that you fuck yourself,” and I genuinely believe that. However…figure out what you can tell folks and what you shouldn’t tell folks. I have no problem telling people I have guns, and lots of them. I don’t even have a problem telling folks I have body armor. I certainly don’t tell them where I store that equipment, nor do I tell them specific numbers or types. I don’t go around talking to people about specific people, groups, or places I’ve conducted training classes.
- Asking unusual questions or favors of people with questionable loyalties. If you’re not sure the guy is on your side or not, don’t ask him to find out which car the local security director will be taking to the meeting three towns away. Don’t ask him to stick this “secret gift” in the the guy’s desk, without telling anyone….Keep your auxiliary activities amongst people you trust, and let them keep their activities amongst people they trust.
- Don’t be so eager to recruit people that you don’t do due diligence. In the here and now, conduct multiple “interviews” with them, and conduct a background check of some form, to ensure they are who they say they are. In the active phase of a resistance, do what criminal gangs do…make them “prove” themselves…
Ultimately, auxiliary members and organizations derive their protection from two means–their compartmented structure, and the undercover nature of their functions. While the guerrilla force may be forced to move from one base camp area to another, the auxiliary doesn’t really have that option, if they hope to remain useful. Because the entire resistance movement in a given area relies so heavily on the logistics support and early warning service that the auxiliary provides, security must be the first thought when organizing cells. The resistance cannot survive without the support of its greatest asset–the civilian population. The civilian population, regardless of their level of support for the resistance, cannot provide that support without the auxiliary.
Auxiliary members continue their day-to-day lives, presenting no apparent break in their daily routines, while at the same time, they engage in resistance activities. They are, in fact, leading double lives, and their ability to succeed in that hinges on their ability to keep that side of their lives secret from all, including friends and family who are not active members of the resistance. School-age children who spend any time with other children and want to “impress” their friends, wives who like to gossip with their girlfriends, mothers who are concerned about your safety, friends who think it’s “funny” to out their buddy to other friends….any of them will get you a short trip to a shallow ditch if they know things they don’t need to know.
The auxiliary member tasked with a certain aspect of a job may call on other people, outside of the resistance, to accomplish his plans, but those who unwittingly, or unwillingly, give their temporary support to the resistance, as mentioned previously, are not considered to be part of the auxiliary. Some may be paid temporary help, such as the drug smuggler you pay to bring in a load of guns or ammunition. Some may be coerced, because you know they have a family member in the resistance, even though they don’t support the resistance themselves. Personnel who are supportive of the resistance, but may be under surveillance by the regime may be of little value to the resistance. Ultimately, relying only on people you know support the resistance, and whom you trust, will go a long way to maintaining security of the cellular network.
Specific task categories the auxiliary’s cells may be required to fulfill can include developing a security plan for the auxiliary and providing security for meetings of the command committee. A cell may be tasked with developing a guerrilla hospital, from acquiring the necessary medical supplies and setting up a one-bed hospital in someone’s basement, to developing a relationship with a sympathetic surgeon or veterinarian.
Another cell may be tasked with developing a transportation network of over-the-road drivers, cab drivers, and local delivery drivers, to mapping out a series of safehouses and hide sites that they can move people and supplies through. A fourth cell may be tasked with assisted recovery of evading personnel. Several cells may be tasked with logistics support by acquiring, cataloging, and storing different classes of supplies, from weapons and munitions to foodstuffs. They may also simply develop the networks among supportive farmers and gardeners to ensure they can purchase a cut of the crop each harvest, to ensure the resistance has food for its people.
Another cell may be tasked with PSYOP, developing a complete PSYOP program to ensure that the local civilian populace and the regime’s security forces personnel learn what is really going on, versus what the regime’s spokespersons say is going on.
Another cell may be tasked with S-2. This would include determining what specific intelligence information the guerrillas need, and then developing the connections and means to acquire that information, collate it, and determine what it means.
Another cell may be tasked with operating a communications network, including telephones, computer/internet, and courier communications. Another cell might be tasked with raising funds, either in the form of donations, or other means (historically, this has meant “taxing” local merchants and citizens, or running drugs….I don’t suggest either as an ideal method, but developing a local black market and having things to sell on it, might be the way to go. Hell, I bet 70% or more of the readership of this blog uses the black market now, whether they realize it or not. I make it a point to try and do so.).
Another cell might decide to be tasked with sabotage or other forms of subversion in a sort of “part-time guerrilla” role. This would allow them to hit targets that were out of reach of the paramilitary guerrilla force, or were not “legitimate” targets for the guerrilla force to strike.